This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negati¨e externalities or positi¨e externalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions. I characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation: the Open Ž .
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, coalition formation has gained increasing prominence across a broad spectrum of economic disciplines, from industrial organization to international trade. For example, research coalitions have become an increasingly important business strategy among oligopolistic firms. The IBM᎐Apple᎐Motorola ''PowerPC'' alliance in the computer industry is a well-publicized example. In international trade, there has been a recent trend toward the formation of regional trading blocs such as the European Ž . Ž . Union EU and the North American Free Trade Agreements NAFTA zone. An important feature of these economic coalitions is that they create externalities for nonmembers. For example, an important motivation for oligopolistic firms to form research alliances with competitors is to exploit complementarities of research assets of alliance partners. If members of a research coalition realize efficiency gains by pooling their complementary research assets, nonmember firms may suffer a competitive disadvantage against member firms. In the case of regional customs unions, the abolition of tariffs on trade among member countries and the readjustment of external tariffs may worsen nonmember countries' terms of trade with member countries.
The recent surge in the formation of economic coalitions with externalities has produced a new strand of literature on the noncooperative theory Ž . of coalition formation, which includes Bloch 1995 , 1996 , Ray and Vohra Ž . Ž . Ž . 1994 , Yi 1996a , 1996b , and Yi and Shin 1995 These models allow for the formation of multiple coalitions and examine the equilibrium number and size of coalitions.
1 They also share the common framework of Ž a two-stage structure. In the first stage, players for example, oligopolistic . firms form coalitions. In the second stage, players engage in a noncooper-Ž . ative game for example, a Cournot oligopoly game , given the coalition structure determined in the first stage. Under the simplifying assumption that the second-stage equilibrium is unique for any coalition structure, the second stage game is typically reduced to a partition function, which assigns a value to each coalition in a coalition structure as a function of the entire coalition structure, not just the coalition in question. Thus, an important novelty of these models is that they can capture the important possibilities of externalities across coalitions. In the traditional characteristic function Ž . Ž . approach, as in Dreze 1974 and Shenoy 1979 , these externalities across coalitions are assumed not to be present. This paper makes two contributions to the field of endogenous coalition formation with externalities. First, I argue that the sign of externalities of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic games of coalition formation. I show that, in many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negati¨e externalities or positi¨e externalities on outside coalitions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels in oligopoly and coalitions formed to provide public goods. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions with complementary research assets and customs unions in international trade. I also show that the partition function derived from these economic games satisfy other interesting properties. Aumann and Myerson 1988 , Chwe 1994 , Economides 1986 , Greenberg and Ž . Ž . Ž . Weber 1993 , Hart and Kurz 1983 , and Kamien and Zang 1990 . Another recent development in the noncooperative theory of coalition formulation has centered around implementation of cooperative solution concepts, such as the core, Shapley value, and bargaining set. See Ž . the survey by Greenberg 1995 and the references therein.
Another contribution of the current paper is the exploration of the stability properties of the rules of coalition formation proposed in the recent models mentioned above. Although these models share the common objective of analyzing equilibrium coalition structures, each adopts a Ž . different notion of the stability of a coalition structure. Bloch 1995 Bloch , 1996 examines an infinite-horizon ''Coalition Unanimity'' game in which a coalition forms if and only if all potential members agree to form the Ž . coalition. Ray and Vohra 1994 study the ''Equilibrium Binding Agreements'' rule under which coalitions are allowed to break up into smaller Ž . subcoalitions only. Yi and Shin 1995 investigate the ''Open Membership'' game in which nonmembers can join an existing coalition without the Ž permission of the existing members. Hence, a key difference between these rules of coalition formation lies in what can happen to the membership of a coalition once it is formed: Can an existing coalition break apart, . admit new members, or merge with other coalitions?
Different rules of coalition formation lead to different predictions about stable coalition structures. Due to the absence of a unified framework with which to examine these different approaches, one is left wondering about the underlying causes of these different predictions. The current paper attempts to fill in this gap by examining endogenous coalition formation among symmetric players under some weak conditions on the partition Ž . function which are satisfied for the economic games mentioned above . Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the stability of the grand coalition under different membership rules.
The current paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the twostage approach to coalition formation among symmetric players. Section 3 briefly introduces the models of Bloch, Ray and Vohra, and Yi and Shin. Section 4 examines equilibrium coalition structures with negative externalities. The main result shows that, under a set of reasonable conditions on the partition function, the grand coalition is an equilibrium outcome under the Open Membership rule, but typically not under the Coalition Unanimity rule nor the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule. I also identify conditions under which the Coalition Unanimity rule supports a more Ž ''concentrated'' coalition structure roughly speaking, a coalition structure . with bigger coalitions than does the Equilibrium Binding Agreements. Section 5 analyzes the opposite case of positive externalities. I show that, due to free-rider problems, the grand coalition is rarely an equilibrium outcome under the Open Membership rule. The Coalition Unanimity rule and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule do better than the Open Membership rule, but the grand coalition is typically not a stable outcome under these two rules either. Section 6 concludes.
COALITION FORMATION AMONG SYMMETRIC PLAYERS WITH EQUAL DIVISION OF COALITION PAYOFF
I analyze a two-stage game of coalition formation, which is the frame-Ž . Ž . work shared by Bloch 1996 , Ray and Vohra 1994 and Yi and Shin Ž . Ž . 1995 . I adopt the notation of Yi and Shin 1995 . In the first stage, players form coalitions. In the second stage, players engage in a noncooperative game given the coalition structure. There are N players, labeled P , P , . . . , P . I start with some definitions and assumptions.
Throughout the paper, I assume that all players are ex ante identical. More formally, let X i be player i's strategy set in the second-stage game and let Under Assumption 2.1, each player has the same strategy set in the second-stage game. Furthermore, the identities of the players do not matter. Obviously, the assumption of symmetric players is restrictive. Nonetheless, we shall soon see that significant complexities arise in the analysis of stable coalition structures even among symmetric players. In order to further simplify the analysis, I assume that the second-stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome for any coalition structure. Under this assumption, the second-stage game can be reduced to the payoff functions i : C ª R, where C is the set of all feasible coalition structures.
For simplicity, I am using the same notation for player i's payoff.
The symmetry and the uniqueness assumptions imply that, in a given Ž coalition structure, a coalition's payoff i.e., the sum of payoffs to its . members depends only on the number and the size of coalitions. However, the payoffs do not depend on which player belongs to which coalition. More formally, suppose that players P and P belong to coalition B ,
player P to B , and player P to B , respectively in a coalition structure Throughout this paper, I assume equal sharing of the coalition payoff among coalition members: Each player in a given coalition receives the same payoff as the other members. That is, I rule out any side payments with respect to membership decisions. I rely upon the assumption of ex ante identical players in order to justify the equal division of the coalition Ž Ž . payoff. Recent work by Ray and Vohra 1995 provides a justification for this assumption of equal division of coalition payoff. In an infinite-horizon model of coalition formation among symmetric players with endogenous sharing rules, they show that the equal sharing of coalition payoff emerges . as the equilibrium sharing rule in any equilibrium without delay.
Ž . Under the equal sharing assumption, we can denote by n ; C the i per-member payoff of a member of the size-n coalition in the coalition Ž . the players do, then n ; C s n , and Ł n ' n n is the familiar
characteristic function, under the added assumption that the identities of . ŽÄ 4. coalition members are payoff-irrelevant. For example, 3; 3,2 is the Ä 4 payoff of a member of the size-3 coalition in a coalition structure 3, 2 . In order to compare the equilibrium coalition structures under different rules of coalition formation, I use the notion of concentration, which Yi Ž . and Shin 1995 introduced. 
Ž .
1 C s C and C s C ; and
Ž . some i r , j r s 1, . . . , m r and for all r s 2, . . . , R.
can obtain C from CЈ by a finite sequence of moving one member at a time from a coalition in CЈ to another coalition of equal or larger size. Ž . Notice that mЈ y m G 0 coalitions are dissolved in the process. Concentration, like the usual notion of refinementr coarsening of coalition structures, is a partial ordering. The next result shows that if a coalition structure C is coarser than another coalition structure CЈ, then C is more concentrated than CЈ.
X n qn coalition. Repeat these steps n times, and so on. In each of 1 2 3 these steps, the new coalition structure is created by moving a member of a coalition to an equal-sized or larger coalition in the old coalition structure.
Notice that the reverse of Lemma 2.1 is not true: There exist some coalition structures which cannot be ranked under refinement but which Ä 4 can be ranked under concentration. For example, 5, 1 is more concen-Ä 4 Ä 4 trated than 3, 3 , which in turn is more concentrated than 2, 2, 2 . These three coalition structures cannot be ordered under refinement.
RULES OF COALITION FORMATION

Open Membership Game
Ž
. Yi and Shin 1995 examine a simultaneous-move ''Open Membership'' game in which membership in a coalition is open to all players who are willing to abide by the rules of the coalition. This game is designed to model an institutional environment in which players are allowed to form coalitions freely, as long as no player is excluded from joining a coalition.
In this game, each player announces an ''address'' simultaneously. The players that announce the same address belong to the same coalition. structure C R than under the original coalition structure C s C 1 .
STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
This section examines stable coalition structures for the case of negative Ž . external effects, i.e., the case in which the formation or merger of coalitions reduces the payoffs of players who belong to other coalitions. I show that some interesting economic coalitions, such as research coalitions with complementary research assets in oligopoly and customs unions in international trade, create negative externalities for nonmember players. In the case of research coalitions, a member firm of a research coalition gains access to the total pool of complementary research assets of all member firms. Hence, the formation of a research coalition confers on member firms a competitive edge against nonmember firms, thereby reducing the profits of nonmember firms. In the case of customs unions, the member countries of a customs union acquire a greater monopoly power in setting the terms of trade against nonmember countries. As a result, the formation of a customs union reduces the welfare of nonmember coun-tries. I then show that the per-member partition function derived from these economic games of coalition formation satisfies other interesting conditions. Under these conditions on the per-member partition function, I characterize equilibrium coalition structures under the three rules of coalition formation discussed above. The main result in this section is that the Open Membership rule supports the grand coalition as the stable coalition structure but the Coalition Unanimity rule or the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule typically does not.
Conditions on the Per-Member Partition Function: Negati¨e Externalities
Ä 4 Ä 4 N.1 n ; C ) n ; CЈ , where n ; C, CЈ and CЈ _ n can be
If coalitions merge to form a larger coalition, outside coalitions not involved in the merger are worse off.
Ž . Condition N.1 is the defining feature of coalition formation with negative external effects across coalitions. The next two conditions are Ž about the internal effects of changes in the coalition structure i.e., the . effects on players involved in the changes in the coalition structure .
A member of a coalition becomes better off if his coalition merges with larger or equal-sized coalitions. all members. Similarly, the existing members of a coalition become better . off by admitting a new member from another coalition of equal size. This fact will become important when comparing the stable coalition structures under different rules of coalition formation.
Ž . As mentioned above, condition N.2 is silent on how a merger of coalitions affects the members of larger coalitions. The following definition concerns the effect of a merger with a one-player coalition on the members of a larger coalition.
The integer k is the largest integer such that the existing members of a characterizing equilibrium coalition structures with negative externalities.
Economic Models of Coalition Formation with Negati¨e Externalities
Ž . Ž . Assumptions N.1 ᎐ N.3 are satisfied in many interesting economic games of coalition formation. This subsection illustrates this point by Ž . showing that these conditions are satisfied by simple models of 1 research Ž . coalitions with complementary research assets in oligopoly and 2 customs unions in international trade.
Research Coalitions with Complementary Research Assets
Ž .
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with inverse demand P X s A y X, where X is the industry output. There are N ex ante symmetric firms, each of which has one unit of unique research asset or ''knowledge.'' If a set of firms form a research coalition, they pool their research assets and develop a new technology. They then compete with new technologies in the downstream product market in order to maximize their own profits. Suppose that the cost function under a new technology developed with units Ž . Ž . of research assets is given by c x, s x, where x is output. Assume Ž . that Ј -0: The more research assets firms use in developing the new process, the better the new process is. Hence, this model of research and development cooperation captures the efficiency gains from pooling research knowledge, an important motivation for firms to form research joint ventures.
3
Ä 4 Now suppose that the coalition structure is C s n , n , . . . , n . Then Nash equilibrium of the product market, a firm with constant marginal Ž . cost n , that is, a member of the size-n coalition, earns
It is straightforward to show that the per-member partition function Ž . given in Eq. 4.1 satisfies the conditions in the previous subsection: 
Ž . demand function P X s A y X and the cost function c x,
Proof. See Appendix A.
Ž
The intuition for Lemma 4.1 is as follows. When coalitions say the . size-n and size-n coalitions, n G n merge, their members combine their i j i j research assets and develop a technology with lower marginal costs. As a result, they steal business from other coalitions, reducing other coalitions' wŽ .x profits N.1 . To see why the merger helps the members of the smaller size-n coalition, decompose the change in marginal costs into two steps. Finally, suppose that a member of the size-n coalition leaves his j coalition to join the size-n coalition, n G n . We can decompose the deviator's marginal cost falls to the level of the members of the size-n i coalition. Second, the marginal costs of the deviator and the existing n i Ž . members of the formerly size-n coalition fall to the new, lower level. . formerly size-n coalition rise to the new, higher level. All three steps j wŽ .x Ž increase the profit of the deviator N.3 . On the other hand, since the first step reduces and the second and third steps increase the profits of the Ž . existing members of the formerly size-n coalition, they may earn higher i . or lower profits as a result of admitting a new member.
Customs Unions in International Trade
There are N ex ante symmetric countries. Each country produces a homogeneous good at a constant marginal cost c in terms of the numeraire good. The representative consumer in country i has a utility function of the form
where Q is country i's consumption of the nonnumeraire good and M is 
A customs union is defined as a group of countries with internal free trade and an external common tariff for joint welfare maximization. Ä 4 Suppose that the customs union structure is C s n ,n , . . . , n and let Ž . W n ; C be the equilibrium welfare of a member of the size-n customs
is a nonmember country's equilibrium exports to a member country of the size-n customs union, j s 1, . 
Ž . Ž .
The intuition why N.1 ᎐ N.3 hold is as follows. Suppose that two customs unions, of size-n and size-n , n G n , merge. Members of the i j i j merged customs union abolish tariffs among themselves and impose jointwelfare-maximizing tariffs on outsiders. As a result, terms of trade for wŽ .x outsiders deteriorate, reducing their welfare N.1 . The members of the smaller customs union benefit from this merger, because they obtain a tariff-free access to n markets in return for granting members of the i wŽ .x size-n customs union a tariff-free access to n markets, n G n N. 2 .
Now, suppose that a member of the size-n customs union leaves its j customs union to join the size-n customs union, n G n . Essentially, this
deviator gives up a tariff-free access to n y 1 countries in return for j obtaining a tariff-free access to n countries. This deviator's welfare i improves, since an increase in the number of markets with tariff-free wŽ .x 4 access increases a country's welfare N. 3 . 4 As in research coalitions with complementary assets, the existing members of the large customs union need not benefit by admitting a member of a small customs union. The reason is that they gain tariff-free access to a single country in return for granting this new member tariff-free access to all existing member countries. Similarly, the members of a large customs union need not gain from the merger with a small customs union. n Gn G иии G n . C is not a Nash equilibrium outcome, because a 1 2 m member of the size-n coalition, i G 2, can earn a higher payoff by i changing his address to the one announced by the members of the size-n 1 Ä 4 coalition. The grand coalition N is a Nash equilibrium outcome since no player benefits by changing his address to form a one-player coalition.
Equilibrium Coalition Structures with Negati¨e Externalities
Q.E.D.
Infinite-Horizon Coalition Unanimity Game
Suppose that s , s , . . . , s are the announcements of coalition sizes in 1 2 m Ž . the generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the Size Announcement game, and thus of the Coalition Unanimity game. s is the i size of the ith coalition to form in the equilibrium path, i s 1, 2, . . . , m. I show that the last coalition to form is uniquely the smallest, and that the second-to-last coalition to form is uniquely the second smallest. Thus, a symmetric coalition structure is not an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, the second-to-last coalition has at least k members so that the number of 0 Ž . Ž . equilibrium coalitions does not exceed I Nrk , where I r is the closest 0 integer greater than or equal to r. The proposition also identifies a necessary condition for the grand coalition to be the equilibrium outcome. . arg max k; k, N y k : P chooses the ''best'' coalition struc-
Proposition 4.2 shows that the last coalition is the unique smallest coalition and the second-to-last coalition is the unique second-smallest coalition. What about the third-smallest coalition? Is it strictly smaller than the fourth-smallest coalition and is it the third-to-last coalition to Ž . . merger of these last two coalitions reduces the payoff of the deviator. Similarly, the third-smallest coalition need not be the third-to-last coalition to form.
Equilibrium Binding Agreements
Ž .
The following result shows that, under N.1 , any coalition structure for which the size of the largest coalition is less than or equal to k is a stable 0 coalition structure under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements. It also identifies a necessary condition for the grand coalition to be stable under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements. the Equilibrium Binding Agreements. N is not stable since k players can profitably leave the grand coalition to form a size-k coalition which resultŝÄ 4 in the coalition structure k, N y k .
Comparison of Stable Coalition Structures with Negati¨e Externalities
As shown above, the grand coalition is the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome of the Open Membership game. However, the grand coalition is often not an equilibrium outcome of the Coalition Unanimity Ž game or under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements. That is, the necessary conditions in Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 for the grand coalition to be . stable under these two rules are often violated. Since the grand coalition Ž . is more concentrated indeed, coarser than any other coalition structure, we obtain the following observation. In general, a stable coalition structure under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements can be more concentrated than the subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanimity game. Consider the following example. The small numbers below a coalition are the per-member profits of that coalition in that coalition structure. In this example, k s 2. In Appendix 0 Ä 4 A, I show that 3, 2 is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition Ä 4 structure of the Coalition Unanimity game and that 4, 1 is stable under Ä 4 the Equilibrium Binding Agreements. 4, 1 is more concentrated than Ä 4 Ž Ä 4 Ä 4 3, 2 . Note that 4, 1 and 3, 2 cannot be ranked under the usual binary
Ž . Ž .
. relation of refinement, because they have the same number of coalitions.
The next result identifies a condition under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanimity game is at least as concentrated as any stable coalition structure under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements.
Ž .
Ž . PROPOSITION 4.4. Assume N.1 and N.2 and suppose that k G Nr2. the Equilibrium Binding Agreements. Proposition 4.2 and the paragraph following it show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanim- Ä u u 4 enough to make the deviation not profitable. In contrast, k , N y k iŝ not stable under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule because k members of the size-k u coalition can earn a higher payoff by breaking off to form a size-k coalition, without worrying about the response of the other players. Under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule, the re-um aining k y k members can only break up into smaller subcoalitions but cannot merge with the other coalition in response to the deviation of k Ž leading perpetrators. However, if the remaining members or members of . other coalitions do break up into smaller subcoalitions, the leading Ž . perpetrators become even better off by N.1 .
STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES WITH POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
This section examines stable coalition structures for the case of positive Ž . external effects, i.e., the case in which the formation or merger of coalitions increases the payoffs of players who belong to other coalitions. Well-known economic coalitions, such as output cartels in oligopoly and coalitions formed to provide public goods, create positive externalities on nonmember players. In the case of output cartels, members of a cartel reduce their aggregate output in order to raise price. Nonmember firms earn higher profits by free-riding on the price increase induced by the output reduction by member firms of a cartel. Similarly, members of a public goods coalition increase their total contributions to the provision of the public good. Nonmember players benefit from the increased supply of the public good without increasing their own contributions. The permember partition function derived from these classical economic coalitions satisfies other interesting conditions.
Under these conditions on the per-member partition function, I characterize equilibrium coalition structures under the three rules of coalition formation. Unlike the case of negative externalities, the Open Membership game typically does not support the grand coalition as an equilibrium outcome. Indeed, the most concentrated equilibrium coalition structure under the Open Membership game is less concentrated than the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanimity game or the most concentrated stable coalition structure under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements.
Conditions on the Per-Member Partition Function:
Positi¨e Externalities
Ä 4 Ä 4 P.1 n ; C -n ; CЈ , where n ; C, CЈ and CЈ _ n can be
If coalitions merge to form a larger coalition, outside coalitions not affected by the change are better off.
Ž . Condition P.1 is the cornerstone condition of coalition formation with Ž . positive externalities and is the opposite of N.1 . The next condition ranks per-member payoffs of coalitions in a given coalition structure.
In any coalition structure, small coalitions have higher per-member payoffs than big coalitions. Now suppose that a member of a coalition leaves his coalition to join a larger or equal-sized one. The next two conditions concern the effect on Ž . the remaining members of the now smaller coalition and the deviator, respectively.
If a member of the size-n coalition leaves his coalition to join a larger j Ž . or equal-sized coalition, then the remaining members of the formerly size-n coalition become better off. A coalition structure C is stand-alone stable if and only if no player finds it profitable to leave his coalition to form a singleton coalition, holding the Ž . rest of coalition structure constant including his former coalition . Notice Ä 4 that, by definition, the degenerate coalition structure 1, 1, . . . , 1 is standalone stable.
Economic Models of Coalition Formation with Positi¨e Externalities
This subsection shows that the above four conditions are satisfied by two interesting economic coalitions, output cartels in oligopoly and public goods coalitions.
Output Cartels in a Linear Cournot Oligopoly
Ž .
Consider a Cournot oligopoly with inverse demand P X s A y X, where X is the industry output. Firm i's cost function is given by cx , i where x is firm i's output and c is the common constant marginal cost i Ä 4 with A ) c. Suppose that the cartel structure is C s n , n , . . . , n and I omit the obvious proof of Lemma 5.1. Instead, I discuss the economic idea behind this result. First, consider the merger of cartels. The members of the merging cartels reduce their output in order to internalize the positive externalities which output reduction creates on each other. The other cartels benefit from the merger by free-riding on the merging cartels'
wŽ .x output reduction P.1 . Next, recall that cartels earn the same total profit regardless of size in a given cartel structure. Hence, a small cartel earns a wŽ .x higher per-member profit than does a big cartel P.2 . Finally, suppose Ž that a player belonging to a nondegenerate cartel that is, a cartel with two . or more players leaves his cartel to join a larger or equal-sized cartel. Since this deviation leaves the number of cartels unchanged, the remaining wŽ .x members of the deviator's former cartel each earns a higher profit P.3 wŽ .x and the deviator earns a lower profit P.4 .
Public Goods Coalitions
Consider the following model of public goods coalitions. Each player is Ž . endowed with 1 unit of a private good. At cost c x , agent P can provide public good. Each player enjoys the same benefit from consuming the
and 2 c x
) c x c x . Player P 's net utility is given by an optimal level of public goods provided by a member of the size-n i coalition is
Given the strict convexity of the cost function, the optimal solution of the Ž . size-n coalition is symmetric. Let x n ; C be the per-member provision of i i Ž . Ž . the public good by the size-n coalition and let X n ; C s n x n ; C be
Ž . the total public good provided by the size-n coalition. Finally, let X C s i m Ž . Ý X n ; C be the aggregate amount of the public good produced under
Ž . i i
In Appendix B, I show that this model of public goods coalitions satisfies the four conditions on the partition function with positive externalities.
Ž . LEMMA 5.2. Public goods coalitions with utility function g X and cost
Ž . Ray Ž .. and Vohra 1994 in which each coalition decides how much to contribute to the provision of the public good which is produced according to an economy-wide production function. In the standard model, if a size-k coalition contributes x and others contribute z, total production y1 Ž . of the public good is equal to c xqz . In equilibrium, only the largest coalitions make positive contributions and the other coalitions make no contributions. Furthermore, if there is more than one largest coalition, the second-stage equilibrium outcome is not unique: While the total amount of the public good is fixed, the distribution of the contributions among the Ž largest coalitions is indeterminate. The total amount of public good in the coalition structure Ž . Ž . is implicitly defined by the first-order condition kgЈ X y cЈ X s 0, where k is the size of . the largest coalition. I adopt the current variation in order to avoid this multiplicity of the Ž second-stage equilibria. The current formulation has a unique second-stage equilibrium . outcome for all coalition structures. This change does not affect the analysis. the amount which maximizes his indi¨idual utility given other agents' production of the public good. This result follows from the fact that, in determining the optimal amount of the public good to produce, a member of the size-n coalition takes into account the positive externality on i Ž . members of his coalition. An inspection of Eq. 5.3 further reveals that, in a given coalition structure, a member of a large coalition produces more public good than a member of a small coalition does. Hence, a member of a large coalition enjoys lower net utility than a member of a small coalition wŽ .x does P.2 . If coalitions merge, the merging coalitions increase their total production of the public good, thus benefiting members of other coalitions wŽ .x P.1 . Similarly, if a member of a coalition leaves his coalition to join a larger or equal-sized one, the aggregate amount of the public good increases but the remaining members of the deviator's former coalition reduce their production of the public good. As a result, the remaining wŽ .x members of the deviator's former coalition become better off P.3 .
wŽ .x Ž Ž . Finally, the deviator becomes worse off P.4 for example, for g X s X Ž .
2
. Ž and c x s cx , c ) 0 because he bears with the existing members of his . new coalition the burden of increasing the total amount of the public good. These results reflect the fundamental free-riding problems associated with the formation of public goods coalitions.
Equilibrium Coalition Structures with Positi¨e Externalities
Open Membership Game
It is easy to see that the stand-alone stability is a necessary condition for a coalition structure to be a Nash equilibrium outcome of the Open Ž Ä 4 Membership game. Suppose that C s n , n , . . . , n is not stand-alone
C cannot be supported as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium i outcome, because a member of the size-n coalition can increase his payoff i by instead forming a singleton coalition by announcing an address not . Ž . chosen by other players. Condition P.4 further narrows down the set of Ä 4 Nash equilibrium coalition structures. Consider C s n , n , . coalition becomes better off by leaving his coalition to join one of the smaller coalitions. Hence, such a coalition structure cannot be a Nash equilibrium outcome. Ž . As a result, under P.4 , the only coalition structures which can be Nash Ä 4 equilibrium outcomes are C s n , n , . . . , n , n G n G иии G n , with 2, 1, 1 , . . . , 2, 1, 1, . . . , 1 , and 1, 1, . . . , 1 . More precisely, consider C s n , n , . . . , n , Ž . entries of k, and q entries of k y 1 . C is a ''symmetric'' coalition . Ä 4 structure given the integer constraint. Notice that N is more concen-Ä 4 trated than Nr2, Nr2 , which in turn is more concentrated than Ä 4 N r 3, Nr3, Nr3 , and so on.
Ž . Appendix C shows that, under P.4 , the most concentrated stand-alone stable coalition structure among these N coalition structures is a Nash Ä 4 Ž . equilibrium outcome. Since 1,1, . . . , 1 is stand-alone stable, under P.4 there exists a Nash equilibrium coalition structure of the Open Membership game. The following proposition records these results.
1 If C is not stand-alone stable, it cannot be a Nash equilibrium coalition structure of the Open Membership game. 
Ž .
3 Suppose that n F n q 1. Further suppose that C is stand-alone 
Infinite-Horizon Coalition Unanimity Game
Unlike the Open Membership game, it is hard to obtain a sharp characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanimity game with positive externalities. But under Ž . Ž . P.1 ᎐ P.3 , if an additional condition is satisfied, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanimity game consists of either the grand coalition or two coalitions. Proof. The proof of Proposition 5.2 consists of three steps.
Ž .
Step 1 If P announces N y k, then P announces k. To see
The first inequality follows from the Ä 4 Ž . Ž . stand-alone stability of k, N y k , the second from P. 2 and P.3 , and the Ž . rest from a step-by-step application of P.1 . Hence, given P 's announce-1 ment of N y k, P 's best strategy is to form a grand coalition among
Ny kq1
the remaining players. 
. . , n y 1, where the first inequality
follows from the stand-alone stability of C and the second inequality from Ž . Ž . P.2 and P.3 . Hence, the breakoff by k members of the size-n coalition i is not profitable if the other players do not break up their coalitions in response to the breakoff by the k deviators. However, if the other players Ž . do break up their coalitions, then, by P.1 , the deviators end up even worse off.
Comparison of Stable Coalition Structures with Positi¨e Externalities
When coalition formation creates positive externalities, due to free-riding problems, the Open Membership game rarely supports the grand coalition as a Nash equilibrium outcome. Indeed, the equilibrium coalition structure with positive externalities in the Open Membership game is often very fragmented. For example, consider the output cartels in the linear Cournot oligopoly model. As we have seen in Section 5.3.2, the degenerate cartel Ä 4 structure 1, 1, . . . , 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the Open Membership game for N G 3.
The Coalition Unanimity game and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements are better than the Open Membership game in overcoming the free-riding problems which arise when coalition formation creates positive externalities on nonmembers. Propositions in the previous subsections show that, for the case of positive externalities, the Coalition Unanimity rule and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule support a more concentrated coalition structure as a stable outcome than the Open Membership rule does. This result is exactly the opposite of what happens in the case of negative externalities. However, the grand coalition is typically not a stable outcome under the Coalition Unanimity rule nor Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule.
So far, I have not been able to produce a general result which compares the equilibrium coalition structures for the case of positive externalities under the Coalition Unanimity rule and under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule. The main difficulty lies in the precise characterization of Ž stable coalition structures under these two rules. Propositions 5. 2 and 5.3 provide only partial characterizations of equilibrium coalition structures in . these two games. In the remainder of this section, I discuss these difficulties through a simple example of the output cartels in the linear Cournot oligopoly model. This example also illustrates the differences in the endogenous stability properties of the Coalition Unanimity rule and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule.
In the case of output cartels in the linear Cournot oligopoly model, Ž . Bloch 1996 shows that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium coalition u Ä u 4 structure of the Coalition Unanimity game is C s k , 1, 1, . . . , 1 , where
r2 is the size of the ''minimum'' prof- Salant et al. 1983 : k 
In equilibrium, the first N y k u players announce 1 and the next player announces k u . Since k u -N for N G 6, the grand coalition is not the equilibrium outcome of the Coalition Unanimity game for N G 6. Ž . Ray and Vohra 1994 show that the stability of the grand coalition under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements exhibits a ''cycling'' pattern: The grand coalition is stable for N s 2, not stable for 3 F N F 8, and stable again for N s 9.
This example may suggest that one might be able to obtain a ranking of the stable coalition structures with positive externalities under the Coalition Unanimity rule and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule, as in the case of negative externalities. Unfortunately, the answer is negative in the case of cartel formation with a linear demand function. For N s 6, Ä 4 5, 1 is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium coalition structure of the Ä 4 Ä 4 Coalition Unanimity game. 5, 1 is more concentrated than 3, 2, 1 , which is the most concentrated stable coalition structure under the Equilibrium u Ä 4 Binding Agreements rule. But for N s 9, k s 8 and, hence, 8, 1 is the unique equilibrium coalition structure of the Coalition Unanimity game.
Ä 4 But 9 is stable under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule, as shown Ž . by Ray and Vohra 1994 .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have examined equilibrium coalition structures when coalition formation creates externalities on nonmembers. I have captured these externalities across coalitions through the partition function which assigns a value to a coalition as a function of the entire coalition structure. There are two main contributions of this paper. First, I have shown that many economic models of coalition formation create either positive exter-Ž . nalities output cartels or public goods coalitions or negative externalities Ž . research joint ventures or customs unions on nonmembers. The permember partition function derived from these economic games of coalition formation satisfies further interesting properties. These properties of the per-member partition function serve as important input in studying the endogenous stability property of different rules of coalition formation.
The second contribution of this paper is the characterization of stable coalition structures under these conditions on the partition function. I have paid particular attention to the study of the stability of the grand coalition. The main finding that emerges from this inquiry is that the Open Membership rule, which stipulates that a coalition admit new members on a nondiscriminatory basis, supports the grand coalition as an equilibrium outcome for the case of negative externalities. But coalition formation rules which allow for exclusivity in membership, such as the Coalition Unanimity rule or the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule, typically do not support the grand coalition as a stable outcome.
In contrast, for the case of positive externalities, the grand coalition is usually not an equilibrium outcome under all three rules of coalition formation examined in this paper. This results from the pervasive freeriding problems which arise when coalition formation generates positive externalities on nonmembers.
I conclude this paper with some remarks on future research. First, Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 provide only partial characterization of stable coalition structures with positive externalities under the Coalition Unanimity rule and under the Equilibrium Binding Agreements rule. A more complete characterization and comparison of stable coalition structures with positive externalities under these two rules await further research.
Second, I have assumed ex ante symmetric players in this paper. This symmetry assumption is common to the recent literature on coalition Ž . formation with externalities, such as Bloch 1995 Bloch , 1996 and, to some Ž . extent, Ray and Vohra 1994 . When players are not symmetric, it is no longer possible to identify a coalition by its size, which is a major simplifying assumption of this paper. As hard as the analysis may be, heterogeneity of players raises the interesting and important issue of the composition of Ž coalitions: Do coalitions in a stable coalition structure assuming that one . exists consist of similar players or dissimilar players or both? One way to begin the analysis in this direction might be to assume just two types of players and see if equilibrium coalitions consist of the same types or of different types.
APPENDIX A
Ž .
X Ž . Proof of Lemma 4.1. It is easy to see that N.1 holds, because -0. More precisely, suppose that the size-n and the size-n coalitions merge. . coalitions is analogous. This merger is profitable to a member of the Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž size-n coalition if and only if n q n n q n y N q 1 n q Ž .x n n y n q1 y n y1 n y1 y n q1 , which holds be-
Ž . cause n y 1 ) n G n ) n q 1 and N G n q n . Q.E.D. 
Ž . i i
Given the specific tariff , country j chooses its exports to country i in is a nonmember country's export volume to a member country of the Ž . w Ž .x 2 size-n customs union. By A.5 , q n is a nonmember country's export .w Ž .x 2 n , this last inequality holds if q n y q n q 1 ) n y n q 1 q n ,
which in turn holds if and only if n y n q 1 2 n q 1 q 2 n q 1 q 1 Ž .
Ž .
i j j i Nq1 q n q1 2n q 1 N q 1 q n q 2 2n q 3 Ä 4
1, 1, 1, 1, 1 . 42, 42, 42, 42, 42 In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium path of the Coalition Unanimity game, P announces 3 followed by P 's announcement of 2, and P 1 4 1 Ž Ä 4. earns 3; 3, 2 . To see why, consider the other four alternatives. If P 1 Ä 4 Ž Ä 4. announces 5, then 5 forms and P earns 5; 5 . If P announces 4, payoff. The departure of one member from the size-4 coalition similarly Ä 4 leads to 2, 1, 1, 1 . Hence, the leading perpetrator is worse off in this deviation.
Ä 4 Finally, 5 is not stable, because three members can profitably deviate Ä 4 to form the size-3 coalition in 3, 2 , which is stable.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Lemma 5.2. The proof of Lemma 5.2 consists of eight steps, which are presented in the following lemmas. Suppose that a member of the size-n coalition leaves his coalition to j join the size-n coalition, n G n . What is the effect of this change in the i i j coalition structure on the total amount of the public good produced? Since we are comparing two coalition structures, we are comparing two equilib-Ž . ria in the second-stage public good provision game. Comparison of two equilibria is difficult except for special functions with closed-form solutions. The following differential technique overcomes this difficulty by finding sufficient conditions on the utility and cost functions under which we can unambiguously sign the effect of change in the coalition structure on the equilibrium amount of the public good.
